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Brad J. Hershbein and Harry J. Holzer 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n COVID-19 decimated the
U.S. labor market in the spring 
of 2020; a partial recovery in 
the summer and early fall left 
historically marginalized and 
economically disadvantaged 
groups largely behind, more 
than in any previous recession.
n Blacks and Hispanics have
had slower employment
recoveries than whites, even
accounting for differences in
education and occupation.
n States hit harder by
COVID earlier on continue 
to lag behind in their 
employment recovery.
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It is no secret that in the spring of 2020 the 
COVID-19 pandemic disrupted U.S. labor markets 
more severely and more quickly than at any point 
in living memory. A blizzard of research papers, 
newspaper stories, and calls for economic relief 
have documented the severe crash in employment 
in the spring of 2020, and the disproportionate 
burden borne by workers in leisure and 
accommodation, workers of color, and workers 
unable to do their jobs remotely. Far less is known, 
however, about how employment trajectories 
have played out for diferent groups over the 
rest of 2020, as a nascent recovery frst gathered 
steam and then stalled, and how these patterns 
varied across states that difered in the timing 
and severity of their outbreaks and economic 
restrictions. 
In a recent working paper, we draw on publicly 
available data on detailed employment measures, 
COVID case rates and mortality, and state 
restriction policies to shed light on how labor 
markets have evolved since the pandemic began, 
capturing trends through the end of 2020. We fnd 
that the overall jobs recovery fatlined in October, 
as caseloads and mortality rose sharply, but that 
this aggregate pause obscured a continuation 
of slow gains among higher-paid workers and 
a second, if much milder, drop among lower-
paid workers. We also confrm that Blacks and 
Hispanics not only had larger initial employment 
losses in the spring, but that their employment 
recoveries lagged over the summer and early fall. 
Even when we control for diferences in education 
and type of occupation, these racial gaps persist, 
although by year’s end there was convergence for 
Blacks even as the gap for Hispanics began to grow 
again. Permanent job loss has also been higher 
among these groups. 
In addition to these disparities by race, we also 
fnd large and persistent disparities in employment 
trends across states. Grouping states into three 
categories based on when their caseloads frst 
peaked, we document that employment recoveries 
have lagged among states that had the earliest 
outbreaks, and that the share of their populations 
with permanent job loss has increased the most. 
Delving into the reasons for this dispersion, 
we show that while economic restrictions hurt 
Compared to prepandemic,
about 10 million more people
were jobless by December 2020,
and another 2 million had their
work hours reduced. 
employment when they are in place, their negative 
impact quickly fades once they are relaxed. Rather, 
elevated mortality rates depress employment not 
only contemporaneously but for months aferward, 
most likely because a greater number of deaths is a 
highly visible and persistent signal for the dangers 
of engaging in economic activity that drives both 
jobs and the risk of infection. Unfortunately, the 
rise in mortality rates that occurred at the end of 
2020 will likely create headwinds for continued 
employment recovery in 2021. 
To ofset these headwinds and increase the 
chances that the recovery is broad and inclusive, 
we propose a series of policies to provide fnancial 
assistance to the workers hit hardest by the 
pandemic and to help reskill workers whose 
jobs are unlikely to return. However, any robust 
recovery will require eforts to control the spread 
of the virus in the immediate future, including 
accelerated vaccination, more widespread and 
inexpensive testing, and increased incentives for 
mask wearing and physical distancing. 
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employment rate, suggesting that this 
employment rate is a good proxy for 
the strength of the labor market. 
The Rising Inequality Gap 
Tis overall recovery, anemic as 
it is, has not been felt equally by all 
workers. Te two panels in Figure 2 
break out trends by occupational wage 
quartile. Each quartile represents a 
fourth of workers based on the average 
hourly wage in their occupation, with 
1 being the lowest and 4 being the 
highest. Panel A shows the modifed 
employment rate, as in Figure 1. 
Although lower wage quartiles have 
always had lower employment rates, 
the gap surged afer the pandemic 
began. Te modifed employment rate 
of the frst wage quartile plummeted 
by an astonishing 35 percentage points 
between February and April, before 
rebounding about two-thirds of the 
way back by October. Workers in 
higher wage quartiles sufered much 
smaller losses, with those in the top 
quartile down only 2 percentage 
points from the beginning of 2020 
by year’s end, and those in the third 
quartile down 6 percentage points. 
While modifed employment rates 
continued to rise slightly between 
November and December for the top 
two wage quartiles, they reversed 
course and fell slightly for the bottom 
two quartiles. Tese losses occurred 
simultaneously with rising COVID 
caseloads and mortality and renewed 
economic restrictions, particularly in 
the hospitality and leisure sector, which 
has many low-paying occupations. 
Panel B in Figure 2 examines the 
share of the population who report 
sufering permanent job loss (that is, 
they lost a job and do not consider 
themselves on temporary layof). 
Research has found that such long-
term job separation predicts lower 
earnings and higher health risks even 
decades later (Ruhm 1991; Eliason and 
Storrie 2006; Sullivan and Von Wachter 
2009). In winter 2020, these shares 
clustered around half a percent for all 
Figure 1  Labor Market Indicators over 2020 
80% 5.75 
worked by people during the reference week of the survey. 
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. 
2020 Labor Market Trends 
Figure 1 presents three indicators of 
aggregate employment over the course 
of 2020. Te red line with circles shows 
the employment rate of people aged 
18–64—the share of these people with 
jobs—although we have adjusted this 
number slightly to exclude individuals 
who reported being absent from work 
for unspecifed reasons. (Te U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics believes 
many of this latter group should have 
been classifed as unemployed instead.) 
Starting above 75 percent prior to the 
pandemic, the employment rate dips 
in March before plummeting over 13 
percentage points in April, gradually 
recovering to 71 percent by October 
and budging little over the next two 
months. Nearly 10 million fewer 
Americans had a job in December than 
in February 2020. 
However, this doesn’t capture the 
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NOTE: The employment rate is the share of non-institutionalized civilians aged 18–64 who report being employed, 
except for those who report being absent from work for unspecifed reasons (many of whom are believed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to have been misclassifed and are actually unemployed). The modifed employment rate 
excludes individuals who report being employed part-time involuntarily. Total weekly hours is the sum of all hours 
many workers have kept their jobs but 
had their hours reduced involuntarily. 
Tus, the blue line with squares 
presents a modifed employment 
rate that excludes individuals who 
are involuntarily part time. Te gap 
between this measure of employment 
and the frst one is 1.5 percentage 
points in January and February, but 
it widens substantially by April to 
4.7 percentage points, and even in 
December is still 2.6 percentage points. 
Tis means that, in addition to the 
approximately 10 million fewer people 
without a job, another 2 million are 
employed but working fewer hours 
than before the pandemic. Finally, 
the dashed black line shows the total 
number of hours worked per week 
across all Americans. Tis metric 
has fallen from 5.6 billion in early 
2020 to 5.15 billion as of December, a 
decline of 8.4 percent, about the same 
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wage quartiles. Tey rose sharply and 
diverged, particularly over the summer 
and fall, with the share peaking at 3.2 
percent in October for the bottom 
quartile. Te slight dips seen in 
December are not necessarily good 
news—because modifed employment 
rates also fell for the bottom quartiles 
(panel A), it’s likely that workers in the 
bottom quartile were leaving the labor 
force entirely rather than fnding a new 
job. 
Recovery Lags for Black and 
Hispanic Workers 
Te recovery in the modifed 
employment rate has also varied 
considerably by race and ethnicity. 
Te solid red and blue lines in Figure 
3 show the change in the employment 
rate, in percentage points, for Blacks 
and Hispanics since January 2020. 
Hispanics initially fare the worst, 
but Blacks also sufer greater initial 
losses than other racial groups (solid 
gray line). Hispanics have also had a 
faster recovery, at least into the fall. By 
December, racial gaps had narrowed, 
especially for Blacks, although there 
was some slippage for Hispanics. 
Some of these racial gaps may be 
due to education and occupational 
diferences. Tus, in the dashed lines, 
we statistically control for these 
diferences. Tis reduces the gap 
substantially between Blacks and 
everyone else in the spring and early 
summer, but plays a somewhat smaller 
role aferward. Tese adjustments make 
less of a diference for the gap with 
Hispanics. Tus, not only have Blacks 
and Hispanics had larger employment 
losses and slower recoveries, the 
bulk of these disparities—especially 
for Hispanics—cannot be explained 
by educational and occupational 
diferences. 
The Role of COVID Mortality and 
Economic Restrictions 
Employment rate losses and 
recoveries also difer across states. We 
fnd, for example, that states that had 
Figure 2   The Bottom Wage Quartile Has Had a Much Weaker Recovery Than the Top Quartile 
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. The permanent job loser share is the 
share of the population (not just the unemployed) who report having lost a job and do not expect to be recalled. 
The (hourly) wage quartiles are based on detailed occupation from Occupational Employment Statistics and are 
population weighted; Q1 thus represents the bottom quarter of workers in terms of hourly pay, while Q4 represents 
the top quarter. 
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Figure 3  Blacks and Hispanics Have Experienced Slower Employment Rate Recoveries, Even after 


















NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. Light, solid lines show the change, in 
percentage points, of the modifed employment rate since January 2020 for each racial group. The darker, dashed lines 
control for worker education and occupational wage quartile. 
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations. 
initial COVID-19 caseload peaks in when there are fewer restrictions. 
the spring of 2020—the well-known However, we also fnd that there 
New York and New Jersey, but also are no lingering efects of economic 
Minnesota, Virginia, and Colorado— restrictions; once these are relaxed, 
had deeper declines and less robust the employment rate bounces back. 
recoveries than states that reached On the other hand, we do fnd an 
their frst caseload peak only in the fall, accumulating impact of COVID 
such as New Hampshire, Wisconsin, mortality (but not caseloads) on 
and Oregon. A key question is how employment rates. By December, a 
COVID caseload and mortality state with 100 more total deaths per 
rates, as well as state restrictions on 100,000 people—about the diference 
economic activity—including stay- between the 90th percentile (Rhode 
at-home orders and bans on indoor Island; 131.8 deaths per 100,000 
dining, among others—have afected people) and the 10th percentile (Utah; 
employment. Using regression analysis, 28.6 deaths per 100,000)—would be 
we fnd that current case rates are expected to have an employment rate 
positively associated with employment, 3 percentage points lower, everything 
while current mortality rates and else equal. Te surge in mortality rates 
the severity of current economic that occurred nationwide in November 
restrictions reduce employment rates. 2020 through January 2021 thus could 
Tis likely refects the short-run trade- pose a looming threat to continued 
of between heightened economic economic recovery in 2021. 
activity and greater virus transmission 
Conclusion 
Te labor market recovery from 
the COVID-19 recession was brief 
and uneven in 2020, leaving behind 
workers disadvantaged by race, 
ethnicity, and economic status. As 
cases ebb and fow around the country, 
states that have sufered—or will 
sufer—numerous COVID deaths 
may experience a slower recovery 
through 2021. An equitable and 
broad economic recovery will need 
a rapid and comprehensive vaccine 
rollout, but we argue in the paper
for several additional policies to 
spur employment. Tese should 
include fscal relief for state and local 
governments to stave of further cuts, 
wage insurance programs for those 
who struggle to fnd new jobs, and 
enhanced funding for sectoral training 
and community college education for 
industries and occupations that will 
continue to grow, such as construction, 
health care, and IT. 
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